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1.  Introduction 
 
The breakthrough for mobile broadband is taking the mobile communications industry into 
a new phase. The number of mobile broadband users in the world exceeds 400 million, and 
the share of the population in Western Europe with mobile broadband is around 10 per cent 
and over 15 percent in Austria and Sweden. This development has been propelled by the 
extensive diffusion of mobile modems (dongles) for laptops and smartphones given users 
ubiquitous access to mobile internet. Consequently, traffic volumes in the mobile networks 
have grown immensely, and the mobile data traffic surpassed the mobile voice traffic in the 
world by the end of 2009, and in for example Sweden, over 75 percent of the mobile traffic is 
data.
1  
A continued substantial growth of data traffic will inevitable force operators to upgrade 
capacity pushing up capex budgets. But the network upgrade could be postponed if operators 
are able to get access to additional spectrum, because the capacity in the network is 
determined by the amount of spectrum. In other words, mobile operators are facing a 
spectrum allocation problem. Spectrum is a finite, non-exhaustible common resource which 
influences the valuation, and some parts of the frequency band are more valuable than others. 
National European regulators are, as part of the Digital Dividend, set to release spectrum in 
the 800 MHz, which have very attractive characteristics for mobile operators. This in 
combination with spectrum in 2.6 GHz allocated for Long Term Evolution (LTE) provides 
operators with the means to offer attractive services to the end customers. In addition, bands 
currently used for GSM, especially 1800 MHz are of interest for mobile broad band access.  
The competition on the mobile broadband market will also drive the demand for spectrum 
aggregation, part of 3GGP standard, which enables operators to combine spectrum from 
different frequency bands. Evolution of LTE will allow carrier aggregation and with IMT 
advanced bandwidths up to 100 MHz can be supported (Parkvall & Astely, 2009). The mobile 
equipment industry has launched flexible radio equipment capable to handle all relevant 
frequencies and access technologies. The fierce competition has pressed down prices enabling 
operators to replace existing radio equipment with new radio equipment for only EUR 10K 
per base station. By combining the deployment of new radio equipment and additional 
spectrum operators are able to increase capacity substantially. This implies that operators that 
are not able get access to additional spectrum are forced to deploy more base stations which 
will push up capex budgets substantially.  
Assessing the value of spectrum is complex and involves different evaluation approaches. 
One cornerstone is the opportunity cost of spectrum that is related to potential cost savings in 
infrastructure that an operator with access to a certain band of spectrum can achieve. Another 
central concept revolves around the strategic value, which gives operators with access to 
spectrum flexibility and a competitive advantage, in terms of service offers with higher data 
rates, compared to competitors that does not have access to similar amount of spectrum.  




The aim with this paper is to present an analysis of the value of spectrum and the impact of 
spectrum aggregation. The value of spectrum is divided into two concepts: the engineering 
value and strategic value. The engineering value is derived from the impact of capital 
expenditures on network infrastructure when more bandwidth is available. The strategic value 
reflects the expected position in the market an operator will hold as a result of the assigned 
spectrum. The paper addresses two research questions:  
1)  How is the production cost affected by different levels of spectrum? 
2)  How does the use of spectrum aggregation influence the evaluation of spectrum? 
The role and value of spectrum aggregation is carried out by modeling different operators 
with different amount of spectrum and cooperation strategies. As a background we can use  
the spectrum allocation in Sweden as an example.  
The operators have deployed 2G and 3G networks with GSM using the 900 and 1800 MHz 
bands and WCDMA using the 2100 MHz band. Deployment of LTE (“4G”) is ongoing in the 
2600 MHz band and is considered for the 800 and 1800 MHz bands. Currently, the operators 
have between 5 and 10 MHz in the 900 MHz band. For the upcoming 800 MHz auction a 
spectrum cap of 10 MHz is proposed. Part of the 1800 MHz band is also considered for an 
auction. In the 2600 MHz band three operators have 20 MHz and one operator has 10 MHz.  
Spectrum aggregation will facilitate a combination of many bands, but in our analysis we 
look into a special case where we consider an urban deployment using different allocation 
combinations in the 1800 and 2600 MHz bands. Combination of 800 and 2600 MHz bands is 
also of interest, but we find this less suitable as a test case since lower amounts of bandwidths 
(5-10 MHz) are available in the 800 MHz band. In addition, for combination of 800 and 2600 
MHz the differences in coverage need to be considered. In our analysis we use different 
combinations of the 1800 and 2600 MHz band resulting in systems bandwidths of 10, 20 , 40 
and 80 MHz
2. The 80 MHz case also includes network and spectrum sharing of two operators.    
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews related work and chapter 3 describes 
the model assumptions and framework for the analysis. Chapter 4 analyzes the engineering 
value in terms of network costs for different amounts of spectrum. Chapter 5 analyzes the 
strategic value of spectrum with focus on data rates. The main conclusions are found in 
chapter 6. 
                                                 
2For all the bandwidths numbers we consider both downlink and uplink, i.e. 2*10, 2*20 etc  
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2.  Related work 
2.1. Valuation of spectrum 
One of the research questions that this paper addresses relates to the valuation of spectrum, 
which makes it relevant to apply a techno-economic approach which combines technology 
with economic and business aspects. Based on the literature (i.e. Doyle 2006, Qinetiq 2006) 
we have listed three approaches to evaluate spectrum:  
•  Economic value: The economic value of spectrum can be assessed by estimating the 
value of the economic activities through the contribution to the GDP by regarding 
spectrum as an input in the production 
•  Engineering value: The engineering value is determined by cost savings in the 
infrastructure of an operator’s network obtained by having access to additional 
spectrum. It reflects the less costly configuration of the network infrastructure 
obtained when more spectrum is available for an operator. It could also be expressed 
as the opportunity cost or the marginal value of spectrum. 
•  Strategic value: The strategic value reflects the expected position and competitive 
advantage an operator would achieve in the market as a result of the assigned 
spectrum compared to another operator that would not receive the equivalent amount 
of spectrum. 
Moreover, there are other approaches to estimate the value of spectrum, like for example, 
use of a benchmark value, retrieved from spectrum auctions, or tender prices for spectrum, 
and market transactions. Bulow, Levin and Milgrom (2009) examine prices for spectrum in 
auctions conducted by the FCC in the US. The authors present a theory that it is bidders’ 
budgets as opposed to their license values that determine prices in spectrum auctions. Budget 
constraints set limits in spectrum auctions as it requires a substantial amount of cash-on-hand, 
and raising this money from external capital markets takes time. The paper raises the question 
why prices vary so widely over time. The argument is that operators can often substitute for 
additional spectrum by using existing spectrum more intensively, by building more cell sites 
or by using other spectrum enhancing technologies.  
The value of spectrum could also be calculated on other parameters, like earnings or cash 
flows. Smith (1996) developed a method to calculate the opportunity cost or the marginal 
value of spectrum. The value of spectrum is derived from the additional cost or cost saving 
depending upon if operators are allocated spectrum or not, and how much spectrum that are 
allocated. This is denoted the engineering value of spectrum. This approach is suitable to 
apply a Net Present Value (NPV) calculation (Sweet, 2002).  
Compared to (Smith, 1996) and (Sweet et al, 2003) the contribution in this paper is to 
investigate both the engineering and strategic value. In addition, we take into account existing 
infrastructure and consider both upgrading of existing sites and deployment of new sites. We 
extend the analysis of capacity limited scenarios (Sweet et al, 2003) to include both capacity 
and coverage limited scenarios.  
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2.2. Techno-economic modeling and analysis of telecom networks 
Another major area of techno-economic evaluation is the modeling and analysis of 
networks, demand, costs and revenues. These kinds of results have been reported from several 
European projects like TERA, TONIC, ECOSYS (Olsen, 2006), (Harno, 2002), (Loizillon, 
2002). An excellent overview of the background, drivers and results of these projects can be 
found in (Olsen, 2009). Recent work on techno-economic evaluation for network deployment 
of fixed broadband is presented in (Verbrugge, 2009). For mobile broad band network costs 
and the relation to bandwidth and capacity was examined early by Zander (1997).  
The profitability of flat rate mobile broadband per se was insisted by e.g. Blennerud 
(2009). Regarding the allocation of costs for voice versus mobile broadband Blennerud 
(2009b) argue that there is a difference in capacity of roughly 10-12 times comparing voice 
and HSPA bearer on 5 MHz. This leads to the conclusion that 28% of the cost should be 
allocated to mobile broadband. The elaborated analysis shows that the cost is EUR 1 per GB 
when the network runs at low utilization, while it is reduced to EUR 0.1 per GB when the 
network reaches a 50% utilization. 
Azcoitia et al (2010) examine the value of spectrum, or rather the impact on capex 
depending on the spectrum band, by applying Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC) model. It 
concerns deployment of a green field network for a country, like Spain, divided in four 
geotypes: dense urban, urban, suburban and rural. It assumes indoor coverage in the three 
urban areas while outdoor coverage in the sparsely populated rural area. In the analysis one 5 
MHz carrier is allocated to each of the four networks that use four different frequency bands: 
700MHz, 900 MHz, 2100 MHz and 2600 MHz. Moreover, the analysis differentiates between 
four levels of market share of the total traffic: 0%, 15%, 50% and 100%, facilitating an 
analysis of fixed and variable costs. Firstly, Azcoitia’s analysis show that, that the variable 
cost increase the most at the lower frequency bands, see table I. This could be interpreted as 
the cell areas need to shrink when the traffic volumes increase. For 900 MHz, the difference 
in capex is 3x times when market share of traffic increase from 0% to 100%. Consequently, 
the cell areas in the higher frequency bands are already at the start smaller making less of an 
impact with a higher market share of traffic. Moreover, Azcoitia et al (2010) show that an 
operator with a 50% market share has to spend 4x times more capex when it is using 2600 
MHz compared to 700 MHz. The difference is even larger when the traffic share is 15% as it 
require 5.6x times higher capex., see table II. 
TABLE I.   CAPEX COMPARISON OF NATION-WIDE SCENARIO WITH DIFFERENT TRAFFIC SHARE AND BANDS. 
CAPEX FOR EACH BAND IS NORMALIZED TO FIXED COST OF COVERAGE DEPLOYMENT (AZCOITIA  ET AL, (2010) 
0% 15% 50% 100%
700 MHz 1,00 1,32 2,08 3,22
900 MHz 1,00 1,19 1,64 2,29
2100 MHz 1,00 1,09 1,26 1,56




TABLE II.   CAPEX COMPARISON OF NATION-WIDE SCENARIO WITH DIFFERENT TRAFFIC SHARE AND BANDS.  
 CAPEX FOR EACH BAND IS NORMALIZED TO COST OF DEPLOYMENT IN 700 MHZ (AZCOITIA  ET AL, (2010) 
0% 15% 50% 100%
700 MHz 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
900 MHz 1,69 1,52 1,34 1,20
2100 MHz 4,05 3,33 2,45 1,96
2600 MHz 7,13 5,66 3,96 2,92
Traffic share
 
Azcoitia et al (2010) underscore that bottom-up LRIC models may be used in order to 
measure and calculate the value of spectrum for the different mobile operators in terms of 
future savings in network deployment and efficiency. The paper presents a conceptual model 
to calculate economic value of spectrum consisting of the building blocks: revenues, demand, 
cost model and profit improvement. 
Regarding the significance of spectrum, Stennek (2010) underscores that sufficient 
allocation of spectrum is a prerequisite for an operator that want to be competitive on the 
mobile broadband market. To provide services with lower bit rates compared to competition 
is a disadvantage. Based on the competition literature Stennek (2010) argue that companies 
willingness to pay for spectrum does not only determine how they can utilize the spectrum 
themselves, but also by their wish to hoard spectrum in order to prevent competition from 
providing high bit rate services. The author underscores that there are significant economy of 
scale on the market for mobile broadband as operators that utilize a large amount of spectrum 
yield lower costs to establish capacity and can produce services with high bit rates, at least to 
a certain level. Operators with large spectrum can produce services with high bitrates, 
proportional to spectrum up to 20 MHz. The advantage is absolute; as there is no other way to 
achieve the same bit rate, not possible to increase the density of base stations. 
 
2.3. End-user perception of service quality 
Pohjola & Kilkki (2006) proposed a model to analyze value creation of services based on 
how users behave and put value on the experience. The assumptions on user perception and 
rating of service quality are based on the findings by Twersky & Kahneman (1993). They use 
the  “Expected Experience” and “Expected Value” functions to represent user happiness. If 
the expected value increases or decreases from the expected value an increment results in less 
additional “positive” experience compared to a larger “negative” experience for a similar 
decrement. This leads to different shape of “utility curves”, i.e. how the utility for a user 
depends on different parameters of a service. This means that a user that expects a 4 Mbps 
data rate would be more disappointed for a delivered data rate of 2 Mbps (i.e. half of the 
offered value) than the positive experience of getter twice the offered data rate, 8 Mbps. 
Examples of utility functions as a function of bit rate are presented in (Sachs, 2007).This kind 
of “behavioral economics” proposed by Twersky & Kahneman has also been used for analysis 
of consumer preferences for flat rate (Mitomo et al, 2007), (Nassar & Mitomo, 2010) and for 
analysis of service availability and data rates Markendahl et al (2008), Pöyhönen et al (2009). 7 
 
3.  Methodology, models and assumptions  
Rather than analyzing the allocation mechanism of spectrum, which has attracted extensive 
research, this paper approach the subject by combining the issue of demand for mobile 
broadband, cost of network deployment and significance of spectrum. The paper set out to 
analyze the value of spectrum from an alternative marginal cost approach (Sweet 2002). The 
marginal value of spectrum are calculated by using the approach developed by Smith-NERA 
(1996), which derive the value of spectrum from the additional cost or cost saving depending 
upon if operators are allocated spectrum or not, and how much spectrum that are allocated.  
The role and value of spectrum aggregation is carried out by modeling four different 
operators. The value of spectrum is divided into two concepts: the engineering value and 
strategic value. The engineering value is derived from the impact of capital expenditures on 
network infrastructure when more bandwidth is available. The strategic value reflects the 
expected position in the market an operator will hold as a result of the assigned spectrum and 
the service offers that can be marketed in terms of data rates.  
 
3.1. Market and demand  
We focus on a limited part of the total market by modeling an Urban area where four 
operators each has a 25% market share. The assumption is that their mobile networks have 
been deployed to provide voice services, enabling us to regard the investment as sunk cost. 
Subsequently, networks are upgraded to LTE in order to offer high capacity mobile 
broadband services. We analyze four spectrum allocation alternatives: 
• Using 2*10 MHz in the 2.6 GHz band, i.e. in total 2*10 MHz  
• Using 2*10 MHz in both the 1.8 GHz and the 2.6 GHz bands, in total 2*20 MHz 
• Using 2*20 MHz in both the 1.8 GHz and the 2.6 GHz bands, in total 2*40 MHz 
• Two cooperating operators that both have 2*20 MHz in each of  the 1.8 GHz and the 
2.6 GHz bands, i.e. in total 2*80 MHz 
 
We assume that the penetration rate for mobile broadband is 50%, with an ARPU (Average 
Revenue per User) of EUR 20 per month and subscriber. The level of data volumes is decisive 
in determining the load of the network. The development on the Swedish market, where 
mobile broadband was launched in 2006, shows an increase of average data volumes from 0.2 
GB per user and month in 2006 to 2.1 GB in 2009. The monthly usage differs among the 
operators, e.g. the customers of operator “3” in Sweden use nearly 5 GB per month. The 
mobile data traffic increased with 105% during 2009, underscoring a strong demand for 
bandwidth. In our analysis we assume three levels of usage: 5, 20 and 80 GB per user and 
month. The usage is spread out over eight hours per day, translating into a busy hour rate of 
12.5%, in line with industry standard.  
 8 
 
3.2. Network modeling, coverage and capacity and data rates 
We are in the following examining the key parameters, starting with coverage. The sites 
are equipped with base stations (radio equipment) and set up into three sectors. We model cell 
ranges of 0.70 km, which implies a cell area of 1.54 km
2 
The next parameter is capacity, which is a function of the total number of sites, the amount 
of spectrum that is available and the spectral efficiency of the radio access technology (RAT). 
The spectral efficiency varies with the distance from the base station, typical target values are 
> 10 close to the base station, < 0,01 at the cell border and 1-2 as average over the whole cell 
(Parkvall & Astely, 2009). In our analysis of network costs, section 4, we assume an average 
spectrum efficiency to be 2.0 bits per Hz, which is in line with what equipment manufacturers 
presents. A spectrum efficiency of 2.0 bits per Hz translates into an average throughput of 40 
Mbps for 20 MHz. This implies that the average data rates are considerable lower than the 
peak data rates that assume much higher spectral efficiency, typically 10-20 bps per Hz. Peak 
data rates and marketed offers will be discussed in section 5. The site capacity is calculated 
according to the following formula: 
 
Capacity = Bandwidth (MHz) * number of sites * sectors * spectrum efficiency  
 
The capacity is subsequently compared with the demand in order to estimate the utilization 
rate, and in case the network needs to be upgraded. We assume that a utilization rate of 70% 
is a critical level in order to maintain appropriate service levels.  
 
3.3. Cost assumptions  
The corporate assumptions relates to operational expenditures (Opex), i.e. site rent, license 
cost for equipment, support cost, operations and maintenance, transmission, power and other 
costs. Opex is set to 20% of accumulated capex, in line with estimates made by Ofcom 
(2009). Moreover, there is also a direct cost associated with customers, covering marketing, 
sales, subsidies, support, and administration, which we estimate to be EUR 80 per year and 
customer, based on industry benchmark.  
We estimate that the initial Capex for building a site, including electronics as well as civil 
engineering and construction work, amounts to EUR 100 000, and depreciated over 20 years. 
We assume that all sites are upgraded to LTE requiring a capex amounting to EUR 30 000 per 
site, including transmission, which is depreciated over five years. The cost of capital (WACC) 
is set to 12.9%. 9 
 
 
4.  Analysis of engineering value  
4.1. Four operators with different spectrum competing on one market, network costs   
In this section, we analyze the engineering value of spectrum. Our analysis is conducted by 
comparing how the utilization level is impacted by different levels of spectrum, and when 
networks are forced to be upgraded. The aim is to exhibit how different levels of spectrum 
affect network costs, and address the first research question:  
How is the production cost affected by different levels of spectrum? 
The analysis will enable us to capture the implicit value of spectrum as a function of lower 
network cost through different levels of spectrum.  
4.2. Network Analysis  
The parameters in our model could be divided into five categories. The first relates to the 
demand function for mobile broadband, expressed as demand per km
2, derived from the 
estimated usage per subscriber and population density. Secondly, we estimate the average 
revenue per user to be EUR 20 per month, which is line with market average as Blennerud 
(2009) points out. Thirdly, the network load factor determines the demand in peak hour, and 
constitutes at least the capacity that the network has to manage. Fourthly, costs relates to 
operational expenditures (Opex) which makes it possible for an operator to run a mobile 
network with services and customers. Fifth, capex are acquisitions of equipment and 
establishments of the infrastructure.  
The four operators in our analysis start with similar networks, equipped with the same 
number of sites, and splitting the market equally each having a 25% market share, but the 
only differentiator is the amount of spectrum allocated to each of them. It ranges from 10 
MHz, 20 MHz, 40 MHz to 80 MHz applicable for LTE services. This implies that the 
capacity, expressed as Mbps per km
2, is 8x times higher for operator D compared to operator 
A, stretching from 39 to 312 Mbps per km
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Figure 1: Spectrum, peak rate and capacity per km
2 for the four operators 10 
 
All of the four networks have sufficient capacity to manage data volumes generated from 
an average usage of 5 GB per month and user. But with an increased usage to 20 GB per user 
and month operator A is required toupgrade its network, while the three other operators have 
sufficient capacity to manage the requested demand. However, an increased usage to 80 GB, 
which is 40x times higher than the current average usage in Sweden, creates capacity problem 
for three out of the four operators, as illustrated by Figure 2. Although, this is a theoretical 
illustration as it is unfeasible to run a network with a 500% load, it is an illustration on the 
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Figure 2: Utilization rate of the four networks 
Consequently, operator A, B and C are forced to upgrade their networks with more sites. 
Operator A, which only has 10 MHz to its disposal, needs to deploy about 1000 additional 
sites to manage the increased traffic generated by a usage of 20 GB. Figure 3 shows the total 
amount of sites that are required to meet the demand for the three usage levels, implying that 
the initial 1300 sites are included. With an increased usage to 80 GB Operator A has to deploy 
an additional 7000 sites in order to meet the demand from its customer base, reaching a total 
of over 9400 sites. Operator B has to deploy an additional 3300 sites, reaching 4650 sites, and 
operator C has to roll out an additional 1055 sites, reaching a total of 2355 sites. However, 
Operator D is able to manage the increased demand from the customers without being forced 
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Figure 3: Number of sites required to manage increased traffic 
Altogether, the increased number of sites adds up to that Operator A with an average usage 
of 20 GB, has to spend EUR 175m in capex, while the three other operators are not forced to 
make any additional investments. However, with a usage of 80 GB Operator A is forced to 
spend 1000m in capex, while Operator B and Operator C have to spend EUR 475 and EUR 
175m respectively. Operator D, which has sufficient capacity, does not have to make any 
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Figure 4: Capex to upgrade  
 
The required network upgrades, which drive capex, translate into higher production cost 
per GB. The production cost is defined as annualized capex divided with delivered traffic, and 
is only covering network upgrade to LTE, excluding the initial network investment with 1300 
sites, which in this analysis is regarded as a sunk cost. Given that no additional capex was 
required for the usage of 5GB the production cost for the four operators are all EUR 0.12 per 
GB. But with the increased usage, which calls for network upgrade, production cost start to 
deviate for the four operators. Operator A are worst off, as its production cost increase with 12 
 
1% when the usage raise from 5 to 80 GB, while the other three operators are lowering their 
production cost at a varying degree. Unsurprisingly, Operator D is capitalizing on economy of 
scale as it has an extensive amount of spectrum avoiding any network upgrade. Its production 
cost decline 94% when the usage increase from 5 to 80 GB, and the equivalent number for 
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Figure 5: Annualized capex per GB  
Altogether, this translates into a deviating profit margin (after annualized capex), but given 
the modest pressure on the networks with a usage of 5 GB the profit margin is 51% for all the 
four operators. This is based on the fact that historical investments for the underlying network 
are regarded as sunk cost. Opex is set to 20% of additional investments. Unsurprisingly, the 
profit margin for Operator A decline radically from 51% to 9% and reach a negative 251% 
margin with an 80 GB usage, severely impacted by the massive network upgrade. The profit 
margin for Operator B is positive up until the usage takes off to 80 GB, resulting in a negative 
margin of 84%, while Operator C is forced to make minor network upgrades, ending up with 
a 9% profit margin. Finally, Operator D maintains its profit margin of 51% demonstrating the 
significance of having access to ample amount of spectrum.  13 
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Figure 6: Profit margin after annualized capex 
 
Altogether, the analysis has exhibit how the capacity is affected by the amount of 
spectrum, and how capex can compensate for a shortage of spectrum. Based on the estimated 
capex levels, which have been driven by the different demand levels we make an analysis of 
the implicit value of spectrum. We divide the capex needed to meet the demand of 80 GB 
with the difference in spectrum holding between operator A and Operator D. It shows that the 
implicit value is EUR 13.5m per MHz, The equivalent calculation is made for operator B and 
C which result in an implicit value of EUR 7.2m and 3.4 MHz per MHz. Subsequently, we 
divide these estimates with the population, in this case 4.0m, giving a estimate of EUR per 
MHz –Pop, which is a standard unit for spectrum, with one unit meaning one MHz of 









































Moreover, it is interesting to examine how these estimates relate to values obtained at 
different spectrum auctions. The German spectrum auction, completed in June 2010, reached 
EUR 1.54 per MHz pop for 800 MHz while just EUR 0.05 for the 2.6 GHz band. Both 
Sweden and Denmark reached considerable higher levels in their 2.6 GHz auctions with EUR 
0.30 and EUR 0.42 respectively. The US has in four auctions reached up to USD 1.00 per 
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Figure 8: EUR per MHz-pop for a number of auctions in the US, Germany as well as in Sweden 
and Denmark (Source Bulow et al, 2009, NRAs in Germany, Denmark and Sweden 
 
Altogether, the prices on auctions and implicit values of spectrum vary, and our analysis is 
limited in scope, but aimed to show the significance of spectrum and regard as an indication 
of the value of spectrum. 
 
4.3. Conclusion engineering value 
The analysis of this case has demonstrated three aspects. Firstly, that operators with 10 
MHz has sufficient capacity to manage demand over 5 GB, assuming 250 subscribers per km
2 
that share 40 Mbps per km
2. This implies that operators with less amount of spectrum have 
options to provide mobile broadband services. Secondly, we have made a radical assumption 
of usage in order to stretch the analysis and show the impact of increase usage to levels that 
currently looks unlikely. But the experience from the historical development of mobile 
communications shows that usage are difficult to predict, and the appetite for bandwith is 
unlimited. Given that the operators in the Nordic countries are equipped with at least 20 MHz 
for LTE they are relatively well prepared to meet the expected user demand for the next 15 
 
couple of years. Thirdly, the case, unsurprisingly, demonstrate that operators that are able to 
obtain more spectrum than its competition, and also pursue network sharing, and spectrum 
aggregation have an extensive competitive advantage as it has the lowest production cost, 
highest margin when the usage takes off. Moreover, it is also able to capitalizing on a 





5.  Analysis of Strategic value – Impact of offered data rates        
The achievable data rates and number of served users depends, as has been illustrated in 
the above, on the amount of bandwidth that an operator can use. In this section, we discuss 
how the value of spectrum can be influenced by the user perception of service quality in terms 
of offered and provided data rates. This has extensive implications on the service offers that 
operators can market, and on the market position related to what “other operators can offer”  
 
5.1. Offered data rates  
The data rate that can be offered is an important aspect when operators market their mobile 
broadband services. Interviews and discussions with major operators in Sweden show that the 
amount of spectrum, and hence the data rates that can be offered are of vital importance for 
the positioning on the market. Many tests of mobile broadband services are presented where 
the operators claim to have “the fastest” or the “the most reliable” mobile broadband service. 
It is also the “peak rate” that is marketed, usually denoted “up to X Mbps”. This is done 
despite operators, vendors and users all agree that peak rate is not a correct performance 
measure. 
Until now, with WCDMA/HSPA systems using 5 MHz of bandwidth, operators can offer 
the same data rates provided that they use the same radio access technology. Additional 
carriers are used for capacity upgrades, but are currently not be possible to use in order to 
increase the data rate for individual users. However, this will change when multi-carrier 
HSPA solutions and LTE with bandwidth up to 20 MHz will be launched. Operators with 
more bandwidth are able to claim that “we can offer higher data rates”. Technically, the 
higher bandwidth has an impact on the user experience in two ways:  
•  Higher peak data rates can be provided 
•  More users can be served at a given data rate when the network is loaded  
 
5.2. Impact of carrier aggregation and network sharing  
In order to capture an understanding of the differences in service offers we compare data 
rate performance for four test cases of operators with different spectrum allocation. Examples 
of average and peak data rates are shown in Figure 9, based on the assumption of spectrum 
efficiency of 2 and 10 bps per Hz respectively. Without any carrier aggregation the system 
bandwidths are 10 or 20 MHz, the cases with more than 20 MHz of bandwidth will result in 
multiple 20 MHz systems working in parallel. With our assumptions the average data rates 
will be 20 or 40 Mbps and the peak data rates will be 100 or 200 Mbps.   17 
 
 
Figure 9: Examples of data rates without any carrier aggregation  
assuming spectral efficiency 2 bps per Hz for average and 10 bps per Hz for peak data rate 
The performance will change if carrier aggregation is introduced, see Figure 10. The system 
bandwidth will increase substantially, up to 80 MHz for two cooperating operators with 2*20 
MHz each. Applying the same assumption on spectrum efficiency as above the average data 
rates can reach 80 or 160 Mbps, and the peak data rates can be up to 400 or 800 Mbps. 
 
Figure 10: Examples of data rates using carrier aggregation  
assuming spectral efficiency 2 bps per Hz for average and 10 bps per Hz for peak data rate 
When carrier aggregation is not used the data rate performance is “almost” similar for 
different approaches, hence the marketed offers would also be “almost” the same. However, 
the introduction of carrier aggregation will change the market condition dramatically since the 
higher total bandwidths can be used to market services with substantially higher data rates. A 
set of questions arise related to how these different offers will be received by the consumers, 
and if and how the market position will be altered.  
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Previous research based upon the ideas of Twersky & Kahneman indicates that it is 
decisive for operators to keep “the promised bit rates” whatever the absolute value may be. 
The user satisfaction is decreased substantially if the delivered bit rate is lower than what is 
promised. Figure 11 and Figure 12 are based on a user survey (Markendahl et al, 2008) and 
illustrate the user satisfaction (from - 10 to +10) as a function of the delivered data rate for 
two values of “marketed” data rate. Note that the very same delivered data rate (200-300 
kbps) results in different values of user satisfaction as it depends on user expectation. The 
“expected value” is 200-300 and 1 - 2 Mbps in Figure 11 and Figure 12 respectively. 
User rating as function of delivered data rate
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Figure 11: User satisfaction as function of delivered data rate (expected value: 200–300 kbps) 
User rating as function of delivered data rate
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Figure 12: User satisfaction as function of delivered data rate (expected value: 1 - 2 Mbps)  
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5.3. Discussion   
These results should be seen as illustrations of potential reactions from customers rather 
than a “evidence”. Moreover, more research needs to be in order to compare user response 
and preference to operator offers with different “expected values” and different pricing. In 
this context the Kano model is of interest.  
Noriaki Kano developed an approach based on “Attractive Quality Creation” that usually is 
referred to as the “Kano Model”. When this approach was presented by Kano it challenged 
the traditional Customer Satisfaction Models which are based on the assumption that “More is 
better”, see (Walder, 1996), (Farmer, 2008). This assumes that the better the provider can 
perform on each service attribute the more satisfied the customers will be. This would e.g. 
imply a more or less linear relationship with different attributes, e.g. if the bit rate of a 
communication service is increased 10 times then the satisfaction of the customer will 
increase 10 times. In the proposed customer satisfaction model it is assumed that the 
performance of service attributes is not equally perceived by all customers. Many consumers 
can value various attributes differently. The traditional assumption on customer behavior, i.e. 
“more is better” is denoted “Satisfier”. Another type called “Delighter” is a customer that 
appreciates more attributes (and performance). Finally, a customer that requires that the 
service always includes all possible attributes and have the best possible performance, i.e. 
there are a lot of “must be features”, is called a “Dissatisfier”.    
To summarize, the abovementioned research and the user survey lead to two conclusions 
about user expectations and user satisfaction:  
•  It is important to provide what is promised.  
•  User will notice and compare if other operators can provide “more” 
Even if a high bit rate is delivered compared to today’s conditions, e.g. 20 Mbps, the user 
will be dissatisfied if the operator has promised 50 Mbps. In Sweden there are examples 
where operators behave differently when it comes to marketing of “4G services”. One 
operator claimed that 99% of the population will get up to 150 Mbps. At the web page it was 
explained that it is “up to 150 Mbps in major cities and up to 80 Mbps in rural areas”
 3. This 
can be compared to another operator
4 that presented their 4G services to offer “up to 150 
Mbps but typical data rates will be in the range 10 – 20 Mbps” 
 





6.   Conclusions   
 
Although spectrum has always been instrumental for mobile operators the new era 
characterized by ubiquitous communication, spearheaded by the diffusion of mobile 
broadband, have given a further push upwards for the valuation of spectrum. This 
development has been reinforced by recent spectrum auctions in, for example, Germany, 
Denmark, India, and the US. This paper has taken a radical approach to the increased usage of 
mobile broadband – estimating a mobile penetration of 50% and usage increasing from 5 GB, 
equivalent to what heavy users currently use in Sweden, increase to 20 GB, and subsequently 
80 GB per user and month. This represents a usage 40x higher than average usage on the 
Swedish market. This has facilitated an analysis of how far an large spectrum holding can 
take an operator. Not only is an operator that is only holding 10 MHz worst off when usage 
reach 20 GB as it calls for network upgrades pushing up capex, it is unable to market services 
with equivalent bit rates as competition.    
The analysis has demonstrated that the engineering value of spectrum, measured by value 
in EUR per MHz pop to be in the range of EUR 0.85 to EUR 3.40, compared to for example 
EUR 1.58 that was paid in the Germany auction for 800 MHz. However, the 2.6 GHz 
spectrum in Germany did only cost EUR 0.05 per MHz pop in the auction. This indicates that 
the implicit value of spectrum and the willingness to pay could deviate. Moreover, it also 
confirms that budget constraints, as Bulow et al (2009) underscore and auction process set the 
price, which could be considerable lower that the value that the operators ascribe to spectrum. 
Concluding, we set out to explore how the production cost is affected by different levels of 
spectrum, and our analysis has demonstrated that an operator with more spectrum is able to 
capitalize on economy of scale, and achieve a higher return of investments. It is illustrated by 
the fact that an operator with access to 80 MHz is able to lower its production cost with 94% 
when the usage increase from 5 to 80 GB. The analysis has shown that there is a direct 
relation between the amount of spectrum and production cost, as operator with less spectrum 
are force to a varying degree of network upgrade which push up capex. Moreover, the control 
of ample spectrum holding and utilizing spectrum aggregation gives a key advantage when 
usage takes off and reaches really high volumes. This implies that the competition on 
spectrum is set to increase, and spectrum aggregation is set to play a key role on the market 
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